In selected countries of the Middle East, it is very easy to establish various types of companies that not only have privileges unattainable for democratic countries.
It is also very easy to hide the true decision-makers, and by using Western banking in combination with Islamic banking, it is possible to initially introduce so-called dirty money into the banking system. In any large amount, but most safely gradually, according to the prepared possibilities of using it.
In practice, such a model allows not only the laundering of funds, but also the concealment of their actual beneficiary and the circumvention of sanctions restrictions through nominee entities, intermediaries, and seemingly legal transactions.
The mere introduction of such funds is only the first stage.
The second stage consists of finding an asset that can be weakened, its value reduced, and then taken over through procedures that formally appear legal.
Now it is necessary not only to shift any potential problem connected with their appearance onto others.
Thanks to the stupidity of entrepreneurs in the EU and the lack of competence and interest of European services, it is possible, even in the first move, to recover a significant part already “laundered” by offering them fantastic contracts with prepared companies of their own.
But this is only the introduction, since these funds are primarily used to take over significant assets for a fraction of their value.
And even thanks to cooperation with corrupt and/or blackmailed bank employees, lawyers, bailiffs, and judges, there are solutions that enable the final takeover of the assets of a given entrepreneur with his own money.
The most important element in this mechanism is that each cell appears to operate separately, but the final effect is one: the takeover of property at a price that does not correspond to its real value.
Specific Events on the Example of Poland
The following description shows an example of an operating scheme in which foreign financing, local intermediaries, banks, enforcement, and apparent loans may create one takeover chain.
A company registered in Qatar offers very favorable financing under strict conditions. It has the ability to disappear quickly and reappear from scratch as a “different” entity.
Through the proper “management” of funds obtained from crimes, it is very difficult to recover them.
A company changing like a chameleon.
Representative in Poland — One of Many
The company from Qatar creates a new entity in Poland or uses existing ones.
Such a company is, for example, an organization from Kraków that offers very favorable financing, making sure that, through appropriate provisions and actions, it leads to takeovers and debts.
It performs this task directly for naive interested persons, but also conducts further criminal activities by using trained attractive women and robbed people as recruiters.
In the event of exposure, it is the scapegoat.
Known data of companies, as well as recruiters and subsequent victims.
Moles in Selected Banks
Corrupt and/or blackmailed bank employees report interesting enterprises and other assets financed by their bank.
After approval, they try to lead to the termination of the loan agreement under any pretext.
In the event of exposure, they are the ones to blame.
It is precisely access to banking information that allows assets to be selected which have high value, but at the same time are dependent on financing and therefore vulnerable to pressure.]
External Lawyers Theoretically “Representing the Interest of the Bank,” “Honest” Bailiffs, and “Independent” Judges
Their task is to bring about the maximum reduction in the value of the financed real estate, enterprise, etc., and to transfer it in a rigged auction to a nominee person or organization. Preferably for an amount lower than X — I will explain below what this means.
Example:
A lawyer — known data — representing the bank, through a bailiff — known data — led to the seizure of all receivables together with VAT, which is an obvious crime, for the rental of premises in a shopping mall, in which the principal amount of the loan had already been repaid, trying to prevent the owner from paying for electricity, gas, etc., so that the mall would lose tenants and, together with them, a significant part of its value.
If this succeeds, the nominee “buyer” will acquire the mall for a fraction of its value — the above-mentioned X — which amount will not even cover half of the remaining claim reported by the bank.
This is obvious theft not only from the borrower, but also from the bank.
In such an arrangement, the bank formally acts as a creditor, but economically it may also be harmed if the asset is sold below its real value and does not cover the declared debt.
The whole process is also supervised by the court, so that the borrower has no way out of the trap set for him.
Fantastic Loan Opportunities for Desperate Borrowers
If the borrower still has some assets and is able to defend himself against collapse, then someone from his business environment, or an attractive woman “with great contacts in the world of international finance,” presents him with a fantastic loan proposal that will immediately remove all problems. Of course, these are only brilliantly prepared scams in reputable countries and with the participation of “known” companies, ending in theft.
This stage is particularly dangerous because the victim, already under banking and enforcement pressure, begins to treat the apparent loan as the last chance of rescue.
Example:
The owner of a shopping mall — known data — whose loan agreement was terminated and whose bailiff takes all revenue from the mall, including VAT, received a proposal for such a loan.
In order to receive it, he only had to prove that he had financial resources in the amount of the above-mentioned X.
Such international agreements and proposals are very precisely documented.
Since he did not have such funds, his acquaintance, an entrepreneur — Daniel, known data, a previous victim of the aforementioned organization — made it possible to show the required amount. It was not supposed to be a loan, but a joint acquisition of funds, half each, for their own needs.
At the moment the funds were shown, everything disappeared, and the “partner” immediately entered the mortgages and accounts of the owner of the mall, making any defense impossible.
Contrary to the previously signed agreements.
He acted similarly toward other acquaintances of his, taking over their assets, for example a house worth 5 million.
In the event of exposure, he will be held responsible, not the people from the Kraków company who control him.
“Thanks” to such an organization, the robbed person himself also finances, with the amount X, the takeover of his own assets.
This is the central element of the entire scheme: the victim not only loses property, but may be forced to provide funds or collateral that enable its takeover.
Because why should a thief touch his own resources if naive people pay for being robbed themselves?
Signals That Should Trigger the Services
It is enough to connect several elements: foreign financing, an unclear beneficiary, termination of a loan, seizure of revenues through enforcement, decline in the value of the asset, an apparent loan, a demand to show the amount X, entry onto mortgages, and the appearance of a nominee buyer. If the services do not see such a pattern, it means a lack of competence or a lack of real interest.
And yet even a layperson knows how to stop such criminal activities.
Especially since in many of the above cases, the actions of certain people are obvious treason, as they directly and personally enable hostile money laundering.
In Poland, such crimes of treason against the country are supposedly — a theory for the naive? — punishable by no less than 25 years in prison and are examined in an immediate and secret procedure.
In the above example, even we, journalists in the United States, have not only knowledge of the above subject.
We also know some of the first names and surnames of the people involved in the above practice, together with scans of passports, company data, scans of agreements and contracts, detailed proposals for dazzlingly “favorable” loans, etc.
Therefore, it is unimaginable that services in the EU and politicians do not know much more about this.
The only thing that may explain the existence of this practice is that perhaps they themselves derive significant benefits from it at the expense of the country and domestic business.
Such actions, and on such a scale, not only weaken our Partners, but significantly enable our opponents to flourish despite sanctions.
Especially since preliminary calculations based on fragmentary information indicate multibillion-dollar crimes by this one organization from Kraków alone.
And there are many more such intermediary companies, and they are throughout the EU.
Perhaps the time has come for our specialists from the United States to show Partners from the EU how such crimes can be quickly eradicated and how at least the lost companies and real estate can be effectively recovered.
Contact for Affected Persons and Whistleblowers
Persons, entrepreneurs, companies, institutions, or representatives of affected entities who believe they may have been harmed by mechanisms similar to those described in this investigation are invited to contact CSNN.
Information, documentation, contracts, communications, corporate records, financial materials, or other evidence relevant to similar cases may be submitted to the CSNN editorial team for review.
Contact: newyork@civilsocietynewsnetwork.org
CSNN reviews submitted materials under its editorial verification, source-protection, victim-protection, and public-interest standards.
https://civilsocietynewsnetwork.org/2026/04/29/sanctions-circumvention-high-value-assets-eu-csnn-investigation/
